Abstract. We introduce a new flavor of commitment schemes, which we call mercurial commitments. Informally, mercurial commitments are standard commitments that have been extended to allow for soft decommitment. Soft decommitments, on the one hand, are not binding but, on the other hand, cannot be in conflict with true decommitments.
Introduction

Mercurial Commitments
A traditional cryptographic commitment is often compared to a safe. The sender places a particular value in the safe, locks it and gives it to the recipient. The recipient cannot see the value, but is assured that it will not change while inside the safe. Then, whenever the sender chooses to, he can reveal the secret code needed to open the safe, enabling the recipient to retrieve the hidden value. Therefore, the two usual requirements of commitment are that it be binding and hiding: the sender is bound to the message, but the message is hidden from the recipient.
We propose a variant of traditional commitments, where the opening protocol is twotiered. Partial opening, which we call "teasing", is not truly binding: it is possible for the sender to come up with a commitment that can be teased to any value of the sender's choice. True opening, on the other hand, is binding in the traditional (computational) sense: it is infeasible for the sender to come up with a commitment that he can open to two different values.
Despite the fact that a commitment can potentially be teased to any value, a tease is not merely a meaningless assertion. A tease of a commitment to a value m is a guarantee that the commitment cannot be opened to any value other than m. In other words, the recipient of a tease knows that if the commitment can be opened at all, then it will be to the same value. It is infeasible for the sender to come up with a commitment that can be teased to m 1 and opened to m 2 = m 1 .
This immediately implies, of course, that if the sender can open a commitment at all, then it can be teased to only one value. Thus, the sender must choose, at the time of commitment, whether to "soft-commit," so as to be able to tease to multiple values but not open at all, or to "hard-commit," so as to be able to tease and to open to only one particular value. The recipient, however, cannot tell which of the two options the sender has chosen (this is ensured by the hiding property).
We call this new primitive mercurial commitment. Mercurial commitments are different from trapdoor or chameleon commitments of [3] . All chameleon commitments are equivocal whenever the sender knows a trapdoor for the commitment scheme. In mercurial commitments, on the other hand, the sender is given the choice, at the time of commitment, whether to make the commitment equivocal or binding. Furthermore, in chameleon commitments, equivocated and regular decommitments look the same to the recipient; whereas in mercurial commitments, the recipient may be content with the decommitment that may have been equivocated (tease), or may require the stronger full decommitment (open).
Note that mercurial commitments directly imply conventional commitments as a special case, when only hard-commit and open are used (and the soft-commit and tease functionalities are ignored).
We have not yet addressed the hiding property of mercurial commitments. For our application, we need a very strong hiding property, namely, simulatability (which we can provide in the shared random string or trusted parameters model, 1 or else interactively). However, such strong hiding does not seem to be an essential property of mercurial commitments, and it is conceivable that, if mercurial commitments find other applications, weaker hiding properties will suffice. Indeed, subsequent to the publication of [6] , mercurial commitments with weaker hiding (based on indistinguishability rather than simulatability) were considered by Dodis, Catalano, and Visconti [4] . To distinguish our strong hiding property, subsequent work has used the adjective "trapdoor" for mercurial commitments that possess it (while we find this terminology helpful, we do not use it here because trapdoor mercurial commitments are the only ones we define).
We briefly describe our notation in Sect. 2.1, and then formally define mercurial commitments in Sect. 2.2. We provide four constructions in Sect. 2.3: based on general (possibly noninteractive) zero-knowledge, claw-free permutations, discrete logarithms, and factoring, respectively. The last two constructions are efficient enough to be useable in practice. Finally, in Sect. 3, we describe the application to zero-knowledge sets.
Subsequent to our work, Catalano, Dodis, and Visconti showed how to construct mercurial commitments from one-way functions in the shared random string model [4, Sect. 4] . They have also provided a generalization (in the trusted parameters model) of our second construction [4, Sect. 3] as well as some new constructions and a framework to unify them with our third and fourth constructions [4, Sect. 5] . A way to modify mercurial commitments to allow for updates was proposed by Liskov [15] . Mercurial commitments that possess independence (a property implying nonmalleability) were constructed in [10] . A generalization of mercurial commitments allowing for committing to an ordered sequence of messages was proposed by Catalano, Fiore, and Messina [5] .
We distilled the notion of mercurial commitments out of the zero-knowledge set construction of [20] , where a particular construction (namely, the one based on discrete logarithms) of mercurial commitments is implicitly used. We believe that abstracting this notion and separating its construction from the construction of zero-knowledge sets themselves is beneficial. First, as we demonstrate in Sect. 3.2, the [20] construction of zero-knowledge sets becomes conceptually simpler when mercurial commitments are used as a building block. Second, when mercurial commitments can be studied in isolation, it is much easier to come up with novel constructions for them, and therefore also for zero-knowledge sets. Finally, mercurial commitments may be interesting in their own right.
Zero-Knowledge Sets
Zero-knowledge sets (ZKS) were recently introduced by Micali, Rabin, and Kilian [20] . ZKS allow a prover to commit to an arbitrary finite set S in such a way that for any string x he can provide an efficient sound proof of whether x ∈ S or x / ∈ S, without revealing 1 The shared random string model assumes that a uniform random string is available for all parties to use.
The trusted parameters model assumes that a public string from some (possibly complex) distribution has been produced and is available for all parties to use; furthermore the (uniform) coins used to produce that string are unknown to the parties (for instance, such a string could be a product n of two large primes p and q, where the primes themselves are unknown to the parties).
any knowledge beyond this membership assertion. That is, the recipient (verifier) of the proof learns nothing else about the set S, not even the size of S. We elaborate on the formal definition of ZKS in Sect. 3.1.
As pointed out by [20] , the notion of zero-knowledge sets can be extended to zeroknowledge elementary databases, where each element x ∈ S has a value v(x) associated with it. After committing to S, the prover can provide an efficient proof for each x of either "x ∈ S and v(x) = v", or "x / ∈ S", without revealing any further information. Sets, of course, are a special case of this, where the value associated with each x ∈ S is 1. Throughout this paper, we use ZKS to refer also to the more general zero-knowledge elementary databases.
Micali, Rabin, and Kilian give a construction of zero-knowledge sets under the discrete logarithm assumption in the shared random string model. This construction is noninteractive (i.e., both the initial commitment and query answers require a single message from the prover to the verifier) with O(k 2 )-bit proofs for security parameter k. They do not show how to remove the number-theoretic details of their construction, and leave open whether constructions not based on the discrete logarithm assumption are possible at all.
It is an interesting problem to consider what alternative constructions are possible, and under what assumptions these constructions can be realized.
Ostrovsky, Rackoff and Smith [22] provide constructions for consistent database queries, which allow the prover to commit to a database, and then provide query answers that are provably consistent with the commitment. They also consider the problem of adding privacy to such protocols. Their constructions can handle queries much more general than just membership queries; they yield two constructions of ZKS as special cases. The first construction is a feasibility result, showing that interactive ZKS can be built out of (public) collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF) and zero-knowledge proofs of NP statements (which require only one-way functions, which are implied by CRHF); noninteractive ZKS can be built in the shared random string model out of CRHF and noninteractive zero-knowledge. The second construction is more efficient, based on the assumptions of CRHF and homomorphic commitments. Unfortunately, it requires interaction (which can be removed in the random oracle model) and requires the prover to keep a counter t of the number of queries asked so far. (For security parameter k, the proofs are of size O(tk 4 ) and, in particular, grow with t. 2 ) We provide an alternative proof of the same feasibility result, as well as more efficient constructions based on different assumptions, as detailed next.
Zero-Knowledge Sets from Mercurial Commitments
We describe the work of [20] in light of our new primitive, thus showing how to construct zero-knowledge sets based on mercurial commitments and collision-resistant hash functions. Different instantiations of mercurial commitments will result in different ZKS constructions with different security assumptions and efficiency.
Instantiating our ZKS construction with mercurial commitments based on general zero-knowledge gives an alternative proof of the feasibility of ZKS from general assumptions (as mentioned above, another such proof was given independently by [22] ). It shows that (noninteractive) ZKS can be constructed in the shared random string model by using as building blocks noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [2, 7] , (conventional) commitment schemes (which are already implied by NIZK), and CRHF. If one is willing to add interaction to the revealing (membership proof) phase of ZKS, our construction shows that CRHF and interactive ZKS are equivalent (because NIZK can be replaced with regular zero-knowledge proofs, which can be based on one-way functions, which are implied by CRHF; on the other hand, it is quite clear that CRHF is necessary for ZKS, because the initial commitment to the set must be collision-resistant). Theorem 4 of [4] subsequently showed that interaction is not needed, and ZKS in the shared random string model is equivalent to CRHF. Unfortunately, the above discussion applies merely to feasibility results; none of these constructions is practical.
Instantiating our ZKS construction with mercurial commitments based on claw-free permutations gives ZKS in the trusted parameters model with proof length O(k 3 ). The construction based on factoring further improves the efficiency, giving ZKS with proof length O(k 2 ) and verification time O(k 4 ), suitable for practical implementation in the trusted parameters model.
For the case of ZKS from discrete-logarithm-based mercurial commitments (which are the ones implicitly used in [20] ), we provide a constant-factor improvement over the [20] construction by utilizing a hash function better suited for such commitments. The resulting construction is within the realm of practical implementation in the shared random string model, requiring proofs of length O(k 2 ) and verification time O(k 4 ) (constants hidden by O here are fairly small and are further analyzed in Sect. 3.3.2).
Subsequent work on mercurial commitments provided additional constructions of ZKS based on different assumptions and with different features, performance profiles, and security properties [4, 10, 15] . Prabhakaran and Xue [24] proposed a variant of ZKS with a relaxed security definition and showed a construction that is not based on mercurial commitments.
The New Primitive: Mercurial Commitments
GMR Notation
Following Micali, Rabin, and Kilian [20] , we use the GMR notation [12, 18] . This section is almost verbatim from [17] .
Let A be an algorithm. By A(·) we denote that A has one input (resp., by A(·, . . . , ·) we denote that A has several inputs). By y ← A(x), we denote that y was obtained by running A on input x. If A is deterministic, then this y is unique; if A is probabilistic, then y is a random variable. If S is a finite set, then y ← S denotes that y was chosen from S uniformly at random. By y ∈ A(x) we mean that the probability that y is output by A(x) is positive.
By A O (·), we denote a Turing machine that makes queries to an oracle O. I.e., this machine will have an additional (read/write-once) query tape, on which it will write its queries in binary; once it is done writing a query, it inserts a special symbol "#". By external means, once the symbol "#" appears on the query tape, oracle O is invoked and its answer appears on the query tape adjacent to the "#" symbol. 
Definition
As we describe in the introduction, a mercurial commitment is a commitment scheme with additional features. The first feature is that, in addition to the usual algorithm for opening a commitment, there is also an algorithm to partially open, or tease. The partial decommitment of a commitment C to a value x means, in essence, that if C can be opened at all, then it can be opened only to x. The second feature of a mercurial commitment scheme is that a commitment C can be formed in two ways: it may be a hard commitment, that is, a commitment that can be opened (and teased) in only one way; or a soft commitment that cannot be opened at all, but can be teased to any value. Let us now describe this more formally.
A mercurial commitment scheme in the shared random string or trusted parameters model consists of the following algorithms: SETUP This is a randomized algorithm run by a trusted third party that sets up the public key for the commitment. We write PK ← SETUP(1 k ). The chosen public key PK defines the (efficiently samplable) domain of possible committed values. Let us denote this domain D PK . If this algorithm merely outputs its random coins, then the mercurial commitment scheme is in the shared random string model. Else it is in the stronger trusted parameters model. HARD-COMM This is the deterministic algorithm used to commit to a value. It takes as input the public key PK, a value x ∈ D PK , and a random string r, and outputs the commitment C. We write C = HARD-COMM(PK, x, r). SOFT-COMM This is the deterministic algorithm used to soft-commit. That is to say, a value produced by this algorithm is not really a commitment because it can never be opened. But it can be partially opened (teased) to any value of the committer's choice. This algorithm takes as input the public key PK and the random string r, and outputs a value C. We write C = SOFT-COMM(PK, r). TEASE This is the randomized algorithm for partially opening (teasing) a hard or soft commitment. On input (PK, x, r, C), where C is either a hard commitment to x with string r, or a soft commitment with string r, TEASE outputs the partial decommitment τ for teaser value x. We write τ ← TEASE(PK, x, r, C).
VER-TEASE This is the algorithm that either accepts or rejects the partial decommitment τ to teaser value x. It takes as input the public key PK, the commitment C, and the values x and τ . OPEN This algorithm opens the commitment C. If C = HARD-COMM(PK, x, r), then on input (PK, x, r, C), OPEN will output the decommitment π for the committed value x. We write π ← OPEN(PK, x, r, C). VER-OPEN This is the algorithm that either accepts or rejects the decommitment π to the value x. It takes as input the public key PK, the commitment C, and the values x and π .
As usual for commitment schemes, we require three properties: (1) correctness: VER-TEASE will always accept the correctly formed partial decommitment τ of C for the correct teaser value x, and VER-OPEN will always accept the correctly formed decommitment π of C for the correct x; (2) binding: no adversary can create C such that it can be opened to two different values, and no adversary can create C such that it can be opened to one value but partially decommitted (teased) to another value; (3) hiding: no adversary can learn whether C is a soft commitment or hard commitment, and in case it is a hard commitment, no adversary can learn the committed value x; moreover, we require that there be a simulator that will be able to form C in such a way that it can later not only partially decommit (tease) it to any teaser value, but also open it to any value, so that the view of the receiver will be the same whether it is talking to the committer or to the simulator.
More precisely: SIM-SETUP This is a randomized algorithm that, in addition to creating the commitment public key PK, also outputs a trapdoor key TK that allows the simulator some extra power that the legitimate committer does not have. We write (PK, TK) ← SIM-SETUP(1 k ). SIM-COMMIT This is the deterministic algorithm that the simulator uses to compute a commitment. Besides (PK, TK), it takes a random string r as input. We write C = SIM-COMMIT(PK, TK, r). SIM-TEASE This is the algorithm that the simulator uses to compute a partial decommitment for any value x ∈ D PK . On input (PK, TK, r, x), it gives the partial decommitment τ for the commitment C = SIM-COMMIT(PK, TK, r).
We write τ ← SIM-TEASE(PK, TK, r, x). SIM-OPEN This is the algorithm that the simulator uses to compute a decommitment for any value x ∈ D PK . On input (PK, TK, r, x), it outputs the decommitment π for the commitment C = SIM-COMMIT(PK, TK, r). We write π ← SIM-OPEN(PK, TK, r, x).
Define the following algorithms:
Committer PK The committer algorithm C PK is a stateful algorithm that responds to requests to hard-and soft-commit to specific values by running HARD-COMM and SOFT-COMM, and then, on request, runs the TEASE and OPEN algorithms on the corresponding commitments. It also maintains a list L of commitments issued so far. Initially, list L is empty. Here is how C PK responds to various inputs:
-Check if and entry containing commitment C is stored on the list L. If it is not, output "fail." Else, retrieve the record corresponding to C. Simulator (PK,TK) The simulator S (PK,TK) answers the queries of the same types as the Committer C PK , but by running different algorithms. It also maintains the list L just as C PK does. The list L is initialized to empty.
• On input (HARD-COMM, x), choose a random string r.
-Check if any entry containing the commitment C is stored on the list L.
If it is not, output "fail." Else, retrieve the record corresponding to C. -If C's entry on the list is of the form (HARD-COMM, C, x, r):
Then no polynomial-time distinguisher can tell whether he is talking to a Committer or to a Simulator. Namely, for all probabilistic polynomial-time families of oracle Turing machines {D ? k }, there exists a negligible function ν(k) such that
(In this definition, we create two oracles: O 0 is a Committer, and O 1 is a Simulator. Then the distinguisher interacts with a randomly chosen oracle, and has to guess which oracle it is talking to.)
Note that, while this definition does not explicitly state that hard commitments are indistinguishable from soft commitments, it is directly implied: The simulator uses SIM-COMMIT(PK, TK, r) both when answering HARD-COMM queries and when answering SOFT-COMM queries, so the resulting distributions will be identical. An adversary who could distinguish hard commitments generated by HARD-COMM(PK, x, r) from soft commitments generated by SOFT-COMM(PK, x, r) would thus be able to distinguish interaction with the Committer from interaction with the Simulator.
Remarks. Note that the notion of simulatability can be defined in three flavors: perfect, statistical, and computational, corresponding to the strength of the distinguisher D. Above, we gave the definition for the computational flavor since it is the least restrictive. Similarly, the binding property can be strengthened to statistical or even perfect to give security against computationally unbounded adversaries. Also note that the definition above is noninteractive. The definition can be extended to an interactive setting; while an interactive commitment phase seems of little applicability to zero-knowledge sets, constructions with interactive decommitments (opening or teasing) may be used in ZKS-like schemes. Throughout the paper, in order to keep the presentation clean, we continue by default to consider noninteractive mercurial commitments (and noninteractive ZKS), and mention the interactive case only in side remarks. Definition 2.4 (mercurial commitment scheme). Algorithms SETUP, HARD-COMM, SOFT-COMM, TEASE, OPEN, VER-TEASE and VER-OPEN constitute a mercurial commitment scheme if they satisfy the correctness, binding, and hiding (simulatability) properties.
Subsequent to our work, alternative definitions were proposed by Catalano, Dodis, and Visconti [4, Sect. 2.3]. One alternative considers indistinguishability-based, rather than our simulatability-based, hiding (and is called plain mercurial commitment as opposed to trapdoor mercurial commitment). Another alternative, which we will call the CDV definition (see paragraph entitled "(Trapdoor) Mercurial Commitments" in [4, Sect. 2.3]) is very similar to ours, but, by slightly strengthening the adversary, can be formulated more simply and thus allows for simpler proofs. The strengthening is the following: the SETUP and SIM-SETUP algorithms are required to be the same, and, in particular, there is always a trapdoor for the public key. The simulated commitments/openings are required to be indistinguishable from real ones even given the trapdoor.
Our constructions from Sects. 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.4 satisfy the CDV definition, while the construction in Sect. 2.3.1 does not, but can be modified to do so depending on the underlying NIZK system. The most notable example of a trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme construction not satisfying the CDV definition is the construction from [4, Sect. 4], which shows that one-way functions imply mercurial commitments in the shared random string model. However, the CDV definition is satisfied by the construction from [4, Sect. 3] , which gives the same result in the trusted parameters model.
Constructions
From General Assumptions
We construct mercurial commitments based on a many-theorem noninteractive zeroknowledge proof system [2, 7] . Such a proof system can be constructed from any trapdoor permutation (TDP) [1, 2] , or from a verifiable random function (VRF) [11, 19] . Existence of TDPs and existence of VRFs are, as far as we know, incomparable assumptions, since VRFs can be constructed based on gap-Diffie-Hellman groups [16] , while no trapdoor permutation is known based on such groups. This construction is in the shared random string model (not in the trusted parameters model).
Suppose that we are given a many-theorem noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system for an NP-complete language L. This proof system operates in the shared random string model, and consists of polynomial-time algorithms PROVE and VERIFY. Further suppose that we are given a conventional noninteractive unconditionally binding commitment scheme, consisting of algorithms (COMM-SETUP, COMMIT). Note that such a commitment scheme is already implied by the existence of NIZK, because NIZK implies one-way functions, and in the shared random string model, one-way functions imply setup-free unconditionally binding bit commitment [13, 21] . More detailed definitions of these standard building blocks, NIZK and commitment schemes, are given in Appendix A.
Below, we describe a (noninteractive) mercurial commitment scheme based on a NIZK proof system and any noninteractive commitment scheme. The idea of this construction is simple: a mercurial commitment will consist of two conventional commitments. The first one determines whether it is a hard-commit or soft-commit. The second one determines the value itself in case of hard-commit. To tease, simply prove (using NIZK) that "either this is a soft-commit, or the committed value is x." To open, prove (using NIZK) that "this is a hard-commit to x." Correctness will follow from the correctness properties of the NIZK and of the commitment scheme. The binding property will follow from the fact that the commitment scheme is unconditionally binding, and from the soundness of the NIZK. Simulatability will follow from the security of the commitment scheme and from the zero-knowledge property (i.e., existence of the zeroknowledge simulator) of the NIZK.
More formally, consider the following construction of a mercurial commitment scheme:
Building blocks NIZK proof system (PROVE, VERIFY) for all of NP, unconditionally binding commitment scheme (COMM-SETUP, COMMIT). SETUP On input 1 k :
• Generate a random string σ for the NIZK proof system with security parameter k. Let us say that the NIZK proof system requires an (k)-bit random string.
• Run the setup algorithm for the commitment scheme to obtain the public parameters required:
(Let the domain D PK be the same as for the underlying commitment scheme. Without loss of generality, assume that 0, 1 ∈ D PK .)
HARD-COMM On input (PK, x, r):
• Parse PK = (σ, p) and r as two random strings, r 1 and r 2 .
•
SOFT-COMM On input (PK, r):
TEASE On input (PK, x, r, C):
, and r = r 1 • r 2 .
• Let the NP-language L t be defined as follows:
. Let the witness W = (r 1 , r 2 ). Compute and output τ = PROVE(σ, X, W ).
VER-TEASE On input (PK, C, x, τ ):
• Output the decision of VERIFY(σ, X, τ ) for language L t defined above.
OPEN On input (PK, x, r, C):
• Let the NP-language L o be defined as follows:
VER-OPEN On input (PK, C, x, π):
• Output the decision of VERIFY(σ, X, π) for language L o defined above.
Theorem 2.1. The construction above is a mercurial commitment scheme, assuming the underlying primitives satisfy the definitions of NIZK proofs for NP and unconditionally binding commitment schemes.
Proof. The correctness property is clear. Let us prove the binding and the simulatability properties.
The binding property The binding property follows by a standard argument from the soundness property of the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system. We give this argument here. Suppose that we have an adversary that, on input PK = (σ, p) can, with nonnegligible probability (k), produce values C, x, x and π and π such that x = x , VER-OPEN(PK, C, x, π) = ACCEPT and VER-OPEN(PK, C, x , π ) = ACCEPT. By construction this means that C = (C 1 , C 2 ) are such that π and π are, respectively, NIZK proofs that (1) there exist r 1 and r 2 such that C 1 = COMMIT(p, 0, r 1 ) and C 2 = COMMIT(p, x, r 2 ); and (2) there exist r 1 and r 2 such that C 1 = COMMIT(p, 0, r 1 ) and C 2 = COMMIT(p, x , r 2 ). With high probability over the choice of p, no such r 2 and r 2 exist, and so one of the statements (1) or (2) is false. Therefore, if the NIZK verifier accepts the proofs π and π , then the proof system is not sound. The case when the adversary produces the values C, x, x and π and τ are such that x = x , VER-OPEN(PK, C, x, π) = ACCEPT and VER-TEASE(PK, C, x , τ ) = ACCEPT, is analogous.
The simulatability property Let us give the descriptions of the algorithms that comprise the simulator, and then prove that the resulting simulation works.
Building blocks The simulator algorithms for the NIZK proof system (ZKSIM-SETUP, ZKSIM-PROVE). The algorithm ZKSIM-SETUP outputs a shared string σ (indistinguishable from random) as well as some secret value s required for simulating a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof. ZKSIM-PROVE takes an input the string σ that was generated using ZKSIM-SETUP, the secret s and some true statement x ∈ L where L is a language in NP, and outputs a proof π that is distributed in such a way that it is indistinguishable from a proof that would be produced by the real prover PROVE(σ, x, w) where w is any witness for x ∈ L. SIM-SETUP On input 1 k :
• Run the setup algorithm for the commitment scheme and obtain the public parameters required:
SIM-COMMIT On input (PK, TK) and some randomness (r 1 , r 2 ), parse PK = (σ, p),
What remains to be shown is that no distinguisher will be able to tell whether he is talking to a committer or to a simulator. This follows by a standard hybrid argument. Let us construct "hybrid" oracles whose output is distributed "in between" the outputs of the Committer and the Simulator. Statement (1) follows from the fact that the output σ of ZKSIM-SETUP for NIZK is indistinguishable from a random σ . Similarly, statement (2) follows because we are using a multi-theorem noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system, and so ZKSIM-PROVE's output is distributed the same as that of PROVE.
Finally, for (3) we need a (standard) hybrid argument. Namely, suppose that for some i, H i−1 can be distinguished from H i . Then we break the security of the commitment scheme COMMIT. We attack COMMIT as follows: suppose that we are given public parameters p, and two commitments C 1 and C 2 . The task is to tell whether C 1 (C 1 , C 2 ) . If ever queried for TEASE or OPEN corresponding to these, run SIM-TEASE or SIM-OPEN. For queries beginning with query i + 1, run SIM-COMMIT. It is clear that, by using the distinguisher, one can determine whether or not (C 1 , C 2 ) are commitments to (0, 0).
Remark.
As noted in the introduction, the same construction can be used to achieve interactive mercurial commitments, from standard commitments and (interactive) zero knowledge proofs. Since both these building blocks are implied by one-way functions, the construction yields interactive mercurial commitments based on one-way functions. Noninteractive mercurial commitments based on one-way-functions are constructed in [4, Sect. 4].
From Claw-Free Trapdoor Bijections
We now construct a mercurial bit-commitment scheme under the assumption that there exist claw-free trapdoor bijections. 4 Specifically, slightly generalizing the notion of claw-free permutations of [12] , we assume that there exist indexed families of bijections {f i } i∈I ⊆{0,1} n , f i : D f i → R i and {g i } i∈I ⊆{0,1} n , g i : D g i → R i , and an efficiently computable distribution on pairs (i, t i ) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} poly(n) such that:
• t i is trapdoor information that allows f i to be inverted efficiently.
• f i and g i are claw-free. That is, when given i sampled according to , no efficient algorithm can, with nonnegligible probability, find s ∈ D f i and s ∈ D g i such that
Employing this assumption, we construct mercurial bit-commitments:
• PK = SETUP(1 n ) = i where (i, t i ) is sampled from .
• Using randomness (r 0 , r
. 4 Note that in contrast to the construction of the previous section, here we construct a bit-commitment scheme, i.e. we commit only to values x ∈ {0, 1}.
• Using randomness
• For both hard and soft commitments VER-TEASE(i, x, τ, (C 0 , C 1 )) checks that
• To open a hard commitment C = (C 0 , C 1 ) to x, created using the random string (r 0 , r 1 ), π = OPEN(i, x, (r 0 , r 1 ), (C 0 , C 1 )) = (x, r 0 , r 1 ).
• Given a decommitment π = (x, r 0 , r 1 ), VER-OPEN(i, x, π, (C 0 , C 1 ) ) checks C x = f i (r 0 ) and C 1−x = g i (r 1 ).
The correctness of this commitment scheme is immediate from the above descriptions. Furthermore, it is clear that these commitments are hiding since all commitments are pairs of completely random elements of R i . That hard commitments are binding follows from the assumption that f i and g i are claw-free. It remains to show that this commitment scheme is simulatable. The key step in showing simulatability is to note that if t i (i.e. the trapdoor for f i ) is known, then one can easily compute f −1 i (s) for any given s ∈ R i , and in particular, one can produce an r such that s = f i (r ), even if s was chosen to be g i (r) for some random r ← D g i . Thus, if one knows t i , then any "commitment" C of the form (C 0 , C 1 ) = (g i (r 0 ), g i (r 1 )) can be opened arbitrarily. More formally, we have the following simulator.
• SIM-SETUP(1 n ) outputs the pair (i, t i ).
Still, all commitments are random elements of R i × R i , and since f i and g i are permutations, all decommitments are unique, so the outputs of the simulator are distributed identically to the outputs of a true committer. Thus, the above mercurial bit-commitment scheme is simulatable; moreover, the simulation is perfect.
Claw-free trapdoor bijections are an established cryptographic primitive [12] . They are commonly realized under the assumption that factoring is hard. However, under the factoring assumption one can construct much more efficient mercurial commitments, as we do later in this section. Nonetheless, the above construction based on a claw-free pair is valuable because the existence of a claw-free pair may be viewed as a generic assumption independent of the difficulty of factoring. Indeed, it seems reasonable that there should be many different pairs of functions satisfying this assumption. Note that only f i requires a trapdoor, so g i may be some, completely unrelated, one-way bijection. It may be reasonable to assume that finding a claw is infeasible when f i and g i have very little to do with each other.
From the Discrete Logarithm Assumption
The following mercurial commitment scheme relies on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in a group G of prime order. When G is taken to be the subgroup of size q of Z * p where q|(p − 1) (i.e., G is the group of dth order residues in Z * p for a prime p = dq + 1), this mercurial commitment scheme is implicit in the Zero-Knowledge Sets construction of [20] . Indeed, combining this mercurial commitment with the ZeroKnowledge Set construction of the next section yields essentially the same construction as [20] .
This mercurial commitment scheme is in the shared random string model. 5 Recall that the Pedersen commitment scheme [23] employs two randomly chosen generators, g, h ← G, and a commitment to a message m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |G| − 1} is computed by selecting a random r ← {0, 1, . . . , |G| − 1} and letting the commitment be g m h r . The commitment is opened by revealing the message m and the random exponent r. It is not hard to show that if the committer can open this commitment in more than one way, then he can easily compute log g (h), a task which is presumed to be intractable. On the other hand, if the committer knows log g (h), then he can easily open a supposed commitment c = g k ∈ G to any message m by producing the pair (m, (k − m)/ log g (h) mod |G|). This observation is essential to the following mercurial commitment scheme which is based on the Pedersen commitment.
• SETUP(1 k ) selects prime order group G and generators (g, h) ← G × G (with the requirement that g, h = 1). Let the message space be {0, . . . , |G| − 1}. .
• Finally, verification is similar to Pedersen's, with an additional step to ensure that the second generator C 1 was chosen as a known power of h, and hence that log g (C 1 ) is not known to the committer:
1 and that C 1 = h π 1 . The correctness of the above algorithms is easily verified. The proof that hard commitments are binding is just as with the Pedersen commitment; indeed, the ability to open a commitment C = (C 0 , C 1 ) in two ways implies knowledge of log g (h). This scheme 5 Actually, this scheme in the shared random string model only if a description of G that allows for efficient group operation, as well as two elements g, h such that log g (h) is hard to compute, can be generated from a shared random string. This is the case for all groups commonly used in discrete-logarithm-based schemes, such as Z * p and its subgroups, as well as elliptic curve groups. It is possible, however, that there are also groups where DL is hard only if the group description is generated using some secret coins.
is clearly hiding because all commitments consist of random elements from G × G. As for simulatability, we define the simulator as follows.
• Let SIM-SETUP(1 k ) = ((g, h) , TK) where g ← (G \ {1}), TK ← {1, . . . , |G| − 1} and h = g TK . Observe that now log g (h) = TK is known to the simulator. It is not hard to see that all the above commitments can be opened arbitrarily when log g (h) is known, and thus the simulator can easily open any commitments that it needs to, as follows. TK), (r 0 , r 1 )) = (g r 0 , g r 1 ) (where r 0 ← {0, 1, . . . , |G| − 1} and r 1 ← {1, . . . , |G| − 1}).
Finally, we note that the distribution of outputs from these simulator algorithms is identical to the distribution of outputs from a true committer: in both cases, g and h are random generators of G and all commitments are random pairs
Thus, this mercurial commitment scheme is simulatable; moreover, the simulation is perfect.
From the Hardness of Factoring
Our final construction is based on the hardness of factoring. Like the discrete logarithm construction, this scheme commits to many bits simultaneously. This is a modification of the trapdoor commitment construction implicit in the GMR signature scheme [12] . We note that a similar mercurial commitment scheme (based on RSA rather than factoring, but allowing for interesting extensions to nonmalleability based on the Strong RSA assumption) was independently discovered by Gennaro and Micali [10] .
The commitment scheme from [12] commits to an -bit message m by publishing t m r 2 , for some fixed known t ∈ QR N and random r ∈ Z * N . Decommitment involves simply revealing r. The ability to break binding and decommit to two different values implies the knowledge of a square root of t; conversely, if one knows 2 th root of t, then one can decommit to any value. Thus, the main idea for turning this into mercurial commitments is to vary t, using one whose 2 th root is known for soft commitments, and one who square root is provably unknown for the hard commitments. (Note that this approach is similar in spirit to the discrete-logarithm-based scheme of Sect. 2.3.3, where a different generator is used each time, whose discrete logarithm is known for soft commitments and unknown for hard commitments.)
We first consider the case where N = pq such that p, q are safe primes (i.e. there exist primes p , q such that p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1), as this leads to a simpler construction and simpler analysis. Then we describe a more general scheme which we show is secure for any RSA modulus N .
A simple scheme The mercurial commitment scheme runs as follows:
• Let the message space be {0, 1} .
• SETUP(1 n ) chooses an RSA modulus N = pq, where p, q are safe primes, and a random element y ∈ Z * N . Let U = y 2 . PK = (N, U ).
• Using randomness (r 0 , r 1 ) ((N, U ), m, (r 0 , r 1 ), (C 0 , C 1 ) 
• To open a hard commitment C = (C 0 , C 1 ) to m, created using the random string , r 0 , r 1 ), VER-OPEN((N, U ), m, π, (C 0 , C 1 ) ) checks C 1 = Ur 2 1 and C 0 = C m 1 r 2 0 . The correctness of this commitment scheme follows directly from the above definitions. Simulatability is also fairly simple:
where N is generated as before, y is a random element from Z * N , and U = y 2 . Because squaring is a permutation over quadratic residues (for N = pq such that p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4)), U is still a random square.
• SIM-COMMIT((N, U, y), (r 0 , r 1 )) = (r 2 0 , Ur 2 1 ).
Again the output of this simulator and of the original scheme are distributed identically. SIM-SETUP as argued above produces the same distribution on the parameters as SETUP. In both the real and the simulated games, every commitment is a pair of random squares. The opening of a valid commitment (C 0 , C 1 ) to a message m will consist of two values; in both games, the first will be uniformly distributed over the 2 th roots of C 0 /C m 1 , and the second will be uniformly distributed over the 2 th roots of C 1 /U . Similarly, the outputs of TEASE and SIM-TEASE will be identically distributed. Thus the commitment scheme is perfectly simulatable. 
This would then allow us to factor N with nonnegligible probability. Thus, this is a claw-free pair. Note also that C m
Since there are two verifiable openings, this must be equal to C m (f b 1 (r 0 ))) ). Such an i must clearly exist, and as long as r 0 = r 0 we also have b i = b i . Thus we have found a claw between f 0 and f 1 which will allow us to factor N with nonnegligible probability.
A
A scheme with arbitrary RSA modulus We will now show that a similar scheme using an arbitrary RSA modulus N can be created using a modified version of the commitment described in [8] as follows:
• Let = + n where is the message length as above.
• SETUP(1 n ) chooses an odd n-bit RSA modulus N = pq, and a random element y ∈ Z * N . Let U = y 2 n . PK = (N, U ).
• All other algorithms proceed as in the simple scheme, using in place of .
Again, correctness follows directly from these definitions. Simulatability is obtained by choosing U = y 2 for random y. For an odd n bit modulus, squaring is a permutation on the 2 n th powers. Since > n this means U is distributed like the 2 n th powers as in the SETUP above. The rest of Simulatability follows from the same arguments as for the simple scheme.
The binding property is a bit more complicated. Here we will use a result by Fischlin and Fischlin [9] . Fischlin and Fischlin define the factoring representation problem, in which (informally) the adversary is given a random n-bit RSA modulus N , an integer , and a random element g ← {h 2 n |h ∈ Z * N }, and is asked to produce
. 6 They show that the factoring representation problem is equivalent to the factoring problem. Thus, we have only to show that breaking the binding property of our mercurial commitment scheme will imply a solution to the factoring representation problem.
Suppose we have an adversary who, when given N, , U can with nonnegligible produce a hard opening (m, r 0 , r 1 ) and a tease opening (m , r 0 ) for a commitment 
Constructing Zero-Knowledge Sets
Definition of Zero-Knowledge Sets
Let us start with an informal definition. A zero-knowledge set scheme (more generally, an elementary database scheme) [20] consists of three algorithms, ZKS-SETUP, P (the Prover) and V (the Verifier) such that three properties hold: (1) completeness: for any database D, for any x such that D(x) = v (where v can be a value if x ∈ D or ⊥ if x / ∈ D) an honest Prover who correctly commits to D can always convince the verifier that D(x) = v; (2) soundness: once a commitment to the database D has been formed (even by a malicious Prover), no P can, for the same x, convince the Verifier that D(x) = v 1 and D(x) = v 2 for v 1 = v 2 ; (3) zero-knowledge: there exists a simulator S such that even for adversarially chosen D, no adversarial verifier can tell whether he is (a) talking to an honest prover P committed to D, or (b) talking to S who only has oracle access to the data set D.
Let us now give the formal definition. This definition is a revision of the original one due to [20] ; we explain the differences below. A ZKS consists of the probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms ZKS-SETUP, P = (P 1 , P 2 ), and V , satisfying the following properties:
Completeness. For all databases D and for all x
Pr σ ← ZKS-SETUP 1 k ; (com, state) ←
Soundness. For all x and for all probabilistic polynomial-time malicious provers P ,
is negligible in k (note that v 1 and v 2 can be strings or ⊥). 3. Zero-Knowledge. There exists a simulator Sim = (Sim 1 , Sim 2 , Sim 3 ) such that for probabilistic polynomial-time malicious verifiers Adv = (Adv 1 , Adv 2 ), the absolute value of the difference
is negligible in k. (Immediately above, the notation Adv
means that the adversary gets to choose x and will receive the result of Sim 3 (state S , x, D(x))-i. e., the two · symbols refer to the same value). This defines computational zero-knowledge; perfect and statistical zero-knowledge can be defined similarly, as discussed below.
There are two differences between this definition and the one due to Micali et al. First, the definition of [20] is in the shared random string model: σ is simply a uniformly chosen random string, unless it is being produced by the simulator. We allow, more generally, for shared parameters to be generated by a (trusted) parameter generation algorithm. If this algorithm simply outputs its random coins, this puts us back in the shared random string model. Otherwise, we are in the trusted parameters model (which, of course, is a stronger assumption). The model of our construction depends on the model for the mercurial commitment on which it is based. As mentioned in the previous section, we have mercurial commitment constructions in both models.
Second, our definition of zero-knowledge holds not for all databases D, but only for those that Adv can output. In contrast, the definition of [20] is stated for all D. This creates a problem: the "for all" quantifier makes it impossible to construct computational ZKS, unless it is also statistical ZKS, 7 because D may contain information that is not efficiently computable and is helpful to Adv. For example, the database D may include information for breaking the computational assumption used-e.g., information needed to invert the one-way function used in the assumption. More generally, D(x) may simply interpret x as a bit string representing the adversary's view, and be equal to 0 if x more likely to be real and to 1 if x is more likely to be simulated. Since the adversary has oracle access to the true database (whether it is interacting with the true prover or the simulator), the adversary can query D on its view, and thus distinguish the true prover and the simulator. To make computational ZKS meaningful, therefore, one must confine oneself to databases that do not provide the adversary with powers otherwise unavailable to it. This is why we restrict the definition to polynomial-time computable databases.
ZKS from Mercurial Commitments
In this section we show how, given a mercurial commitment scheme and a collisionresistant hash function, we can construct a zero-knowledge set. As already mentioned, this construction is essentially the same as the construction of [20] with the mercurial commitments abstracted as a building block.
On the Role of Collision-Resistant Hashing
In order to construct ZKS from mercurial commitments, we need an additional property: that an ordered pair of commitments produced by HARD-COMM(PK, ·, ·) and/or SOFT-COMM(PK, ·) is in the domain D PK of the commitment scheme (this property is needed because we will build trees of commitments, with the parent committing to its two children). This can be accomplished for any mercurial commitment scheme with 7 The ZKS construction of [20] achieves perfect zero-knowledge, and so is not affected by this flaw in the definition. The definition of [20] , however, provides also for computational and statistical zero-knowledge; however, here we argue that their notion of computational zero-knowledge is not meaningful unless properly modified sufficiently large D PK by combining it with a collision-resistant hash function H that maps pairs of commitments into D PK . Then, to commit to a pair of commitments, one would simply commit to its hash value instead. This approach was already used by [20] with the DL-based mercurial commitment scheme implicitly constructed there.
The key for the hash function can be included as part of the commitment scheme's public key. The security of the resulting construction is easy to prove (we will not do so here because the arguments are standard). From now on, in describing the ZKS construction from mercurial commitments, we will assume that domain of a mercurial commitment scheme includes pairs of commitments.
We note that it is necessary to assume collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs) because they are implied by ZKS: to build CRHF from ZKS, we can view an arbitrarylength string b 1 b 2 . . . b as an elementary database D where D(i) = b i for 1 ≤ i ≤ , and i > is not in the database. To compute the hash function, simply run the prover algorithm on the database D to produce a commitment C, fixing the prover-randomness to an all-0 string. It is easy to see that the resulting algorithm is collision-resistant: an adversary who could produce two strings (databases) that hash to the same commitment C would contradicts the soundness property of ZKS.
Building ZKS
Below, we show how to construct ZKS for a database D with keys of length 8 l given
• a mercurial commitment scheme (SETUP, HARD-COMM, SOFT-COMM, TEASE, OPEN, VER-TEASE, VER-OPEN) whose domain includes the values v contained in the database, as well as pairs of commitments (produced by HARD-COMM and/or SOFT-COMM); • a pseudorandom function family {F s } s∈S that maps binary string of length up to l to binary strings of length needed for random inputs r to HARD-COMM and SOFT-COMM. 9 Our construction will be in the shared random string model if the mercurial commitment scheme (and the collision-resistant hash function, if separate from the mercurial commitment scheme) both require no more than a shared random string for their parameters. Otherwise, it will be in the trusted parameters model.
Intuition Informally, to generate a commitment com to the database D, the prover views each key x as an integer numbering a leaf of a height-l binary tree, and places a commitment to the information v = D(x) into leaf number x. Each internal node of the tree is generated to contain the commitment to the contents of its two children. The result is thus a Merkle tree, except that each internal node is a commitment to, rather than a hash of, its two children. The value com is then the value contained in the root of the tree. Fig. 1 . A commitment tree before and after a query for key 11, whose value is not in the database. The parts built in response to the query are shown in the second tree. Hard commitments are denoted by 'H' and soft commitments by 'S'. Each leaf contains a commitment to the value shown rather than the value itself.
To respond to a query about x, the prover simply decommits the corresponding leaf and provides the authenticating path (together with all the decommitments) to the root.
The only problem with the just-described approach is that it requires exponential time (in l) to compute the tree, because the tree has 2 l leaves. This is where mercurial commitments help. Our exponential-size Merkle-like tree will have large subtrees where every leaf is a commitment to ⊥, because the corresponding keys are not in the database. Instead of actually computing such a subtree ahead of time, the prover simply forms the root of this subtree as a soft-commitment, and does not do anything for other nodes of the subtree. Thus, the resulting Merkle tree gets "pruned" to size at most 2l|D|, because the only nodes in the tree are ancestors of leaves in D and their siblings. (This is because if a node is neither an ancestor of a leaf in D nor a sibling of such an ancestor, then both its and its sibling's subtrees are empty.)
Answering queries about x ∈ D is still done the same way. In response to queries about x / ∈ D the prover generates the portion of the subtree that is missing (from x to the root of the empty subtree). The value at the root of the empty subtree is then teased (soft-decommitted) to its two (newly generated) children, and the entire authenticating path from x to com is provided using teasers, rather than hard decommitments. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
To save the prover from the expense of having to remember all the choices it made when generating the tree (both initially and in response to x / ∈ D queries), the prover can generate all random strings used in the commitments pseudorandomly rather than randomly.
Soundness follows from the fact that soft decommitments always have the same semantics, namely that x / ∈ D, and that soft decommitments cannot, by the binding property, disagree with hard decommitments. Zero-knowledgeness follows from the simulatability of commitments and from the fact that decommitments are consistent: a given node will never be (hard-or soft-) decommitted in two different ways. Note that zeroknowledge will be perfect, statistical, or computational, depending on the simulatability of mercurial commitments (however, for perfect and statistical zero-knowledge, the prover must use truly random, rather than pseudorandom, strings; hence, it must be stateful in order to remember the random strings it used when responding to queries.)
We formalize the above description in the following section. There are no surprises there, and a reader able to fill in the details given the intuitive description above can safely skip it.
Detailed Description of ZKS from Mercurial Commitments
Here we describe the precise details of the construction of Zero-Knowledge sets from mercurial commitments.
• Committing to the Database. To generate the commitment com to the database D, the prover generates an (incomplete) binary tree of commitments-resembling a Merkle tree-as follows. First, choose a pseudorandom function F s from the family by randomly choosing a seed s. To simply notation, we will denote Define C x = nil for all other x. Now build the tree in a bottom-up fashion as follows: for each level i from l − 1 to 0, and for each string σ of length i, define C σ as follows:
For all σ such that C σ has been defined in step 1 but C σ has not been (where σ denotes σ with the last bit flipped), define C σ = SOFT-COMM(PK, r σ ). 3. For all other σ , define C σ = nil.
If the value at the root C = nil (this will happen only if D = ∅), redefine C = SOFT-COMM(PK, r ). Finally, com is defined to be C .
• Answering Queries. When the prover receives a query about a value x that is in the database, proceed as follows. Let x| i be the first i bits of x, and (x| i ) be the first i − 1 bits of x followed by the ith bit flipped. Let If the prover receives a query about a value x that is not in the database, proceed as follows. If C x = nil, let h be largest value such that C x| h = nil, let C x = SOFT-COMM(PK, r x ), and build a path from x to C x| h as follows: let C x = SOFT-COMM(PK, r x ); for each level i from l − 1 to h + 1, define C x| i = SOFT-COMM(PK, r x| i ), and C (x| i ) = SOFT-COMM(PK, r (x| i ) ). Note that the only values inside the tree redefined by the above procedure are those that were nil before. Let τ x = TEASE(PK, ⊥, r x , C x ) and τ x| i = TEASE(PK, (C x| i 0 , C (x| i 1) ), r x| i , C x| i ) for 0 ≤ i < l. Return ⊥ together with C x| i , C (x| i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l and π x| i for 0 ≤ i ≤ l. In other words, the prover returns ⊥ together with its authenticating path to the root, which consists of ancestors of x, their siblings, and teaser-proofs that each parent is the commitment to the two children. Security Here we provide only a sketch of the security proof. The scheme described above is complete, because hard commitments can always be (soft-or hard-) decommitted to the values they were committed to, and soft commitments can always be soft-decommitted to any value.
Soundness follows by reduction to the binding property of the commitments. Indeed, suppose that two different answers v 1 Finally, zero-knowledgeness can be proven as follows. First, by pseudorandomness of F , our prover is indistinguishable from a prover who uses truly random strings. The zero-knowledge simulator will run SIM-SETUP to generate (PK, TK), and then use SIM-COMMIT to generate a "commitment" in the roof of the tree. In response queries, it will use SIM-COMMIT to generate not-yet-generated nodes on the path from the root to the queried leaf, and use SIM-OPEN or SIM-TEASE (depending of whether x ∈ D or not) to decommit nodes on the path to their children. The result will be indistinguishable (from the prover who uses truly random strings) simply by the simulatability of the mercurial commitment scheme: the malicious verifier and the distinguisher from the definition of ZKS can be jointly viewed as the machine D O b k from the definition of mercurial commitments, making queries to the simulator or to the real prover. Zero-knowledge will be perfect, statistical, or computational, depending on the simulatability of mercurial commitments (however, for perfect and statistical zero-knowledge, the prover must use truly random, rather than pseudorandom, strings; hence, it must be stateful in order to remember the random strings it used when responding to queries).
Efficiency
In the above, the specific choice of mercurial commitment, collision-resistant hash function and pseudorandom function will affect the efficiency of the protocol. We discuss these efficiency considerations in more detail below.
Let us fix a security parameter k, and we shall assume that all database keys are hashed to k bits, so that l = k. Moreover, we assume that the collision-resistant hash is built into the mercurial commitment scheme, allowing us to form k-bit commitments to pairs of k-bit strings. In this case, the construction of the commitment to the database D clearly requires O(l · |D|) = O(k · |D|) calls to the pseudorandom function and O(l · |D|) = O(k · |D|) mercurial commitments.
Once the database has been committed, proofs of membership or nonmembership consist of l mercurial decommitments each. Thus, if our mercurial commitment scheme allows committing to 2k-bit strings with decommitments of length O(k) (as is true for our mercurial commitments based on the discrete logarithm or factoring assumptions), then such a proof has length O(l · k) = O(k 2 ). On the other hand, if we have only mercurial bit-commitment with decommitments of length O(k) (as is the case for our mercurial commitments based on trapdoor claw-free permutations), then a decommitment to a k-bit string has length O(k 2 ) and the resulting proof has length O(l · k 2 ) = O(k 3 ).
Finally, the verifier needs to verify only O(l) = O(k) mercurial decommitments to accept the proof's validity.
Improving the Efficiency of DL-Based Construction
While in general any collision-resistant hash function can be used with our DL-based mercurial commitments, Pedersen's hash function [23] is suggested by [20] because it is also based on the discrete logarithm assumption and its parameters can be selected from a shared random string. Given a group G of prime order q and two generators g and h, Pedersen's hash function H G,g,h hashes two integers 0 ≤ a, b < q into a single element h ∈ G via h = g a h b . It is easy to see that this hash function is collision-resistant if discrete logarithms in G are hard.
It may seem that Pedersen's hash function is well suited for use with DL-based mercurial commitments over the same group G. This, however, is not true, because the range of hash function is G, while the domain of the commitments is {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. In particular, if G is the subgroup of size q of Z * p for q|(p − 1), one would need to choose two separate sets of parameters: (q 1 , p 1 ) for the hash function and (q 2 , p 2 ) for the commitment scheme, with q 2 ≥ p 1 . This seems to be necessary for the construction of [20] to work (although it is not explicitly stated there).
In addition, to hash two commitments (which consist of two elements of Z * p 2 each), multiple iterations of the hash function are needed, because a single iteration can handle only a pair of elements of Z q 1 .
Here, we point out two minor modifications of Pedersen's hash function that eliminate the need for a second set of parameters and minimize the number of iterations necessary to hash two commitments. Both modifications rely on folklore results.
First, we will modify the hash function to take four inputs instead of two by using four generators (all in the shared random string), g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , and outputting, on input (a, b, c, d) , the value g a 1 g b 2 g c 3 g d 4 .
The proof of collision-resistance of this function is a simple exercise and is omitted here.
Our second modification relies (in addition to the DL assumption) on the assumption that Sophie Germain primes are sufficiently dense (recall that a q is a Sophie Germain prime if p = 2q + 1 is prime). We let q be a Sophie Germain prime. Then the subgroup G of order q of Z * p is QR p . Consider the following efficient bijection φ between QR p and {1, 2, . . . , q}: if x ≤ q, φ (x) = x; else φ (x) = p − x (this is a bijection because exactly one of (x, −x) is in QR p , because p ≡ 3 (mod 4) since q is odd). Now let φ(x) = φ (x) − 1 to make the range of the bijection {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}.
The bijection φ allows us to view G = QR p and {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} as essentially the same. 10 Thus, we will simply modify Pedersen's hash function to output φ(h) instead of h, and to take inputs in QR p instead of {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} by applying φ −1 to them first.
The resulting ZKS scheme takes seven values and seven exponentiations per level of the hash tree to verify (four for the hash function and three for the mercurial commitment). Note that two of the generators can be shared between the hash function and the mercurial commitment scheme. Because verifications require only products of fixedbase exponentiations with four bases (except in the case of tease verification, when a single exponentiation with a random base is required), much precomputation can be done to speed up verification (see, e.g., [14] , which can be extended to multiple bases).
